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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN TORT ACTIONS - THE DEVELOPMENT OF
Babcock v. Jackson
The main responsibility for the rational development of 'conflict,
of laws is bound to remain with the state courts. The respon-
sible court will have to be on its mettle. It must be prepared
to reject unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to make
formulations that reach too zealously into the future or give too
zealous a scope to local policy. It must distinguish between
real and 'spurious conflicts at the outset. It must temper its
freedom to declare local policy and its scope with a sense for
harmonious interstate relations as well. as for the justifiable.
expectations of the parties.'
So spoke Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme
Court in commenting upon the task of the judiciary in seeking
to develop and articulate the fast-changing principles in the conflict
of laws field. His comments would seem to be an appropriate
point of departure for an examination of the developments initiated
in this area by the New York Court of Appeals,* particularly with
reference to its much-discussed decision in Babcock v. Jackson.2
To provide a context within which to examine these developments,
this note will view the state of the New York law prior to Babcock
and then trace Babcock through its application in D3rn v. Gordon'
and in the most recent case in this area, Macey v. Rozbicki.4
Until the early 1950's, the prevailing and virtually unques-
tioned choice of law rule in the United States in cases wherein
the cause of action sounded in tort was that 'of lex loci delictus.r
According to this principle, the rights and obligations of the parties
to the action were to be determined according to 'the law of the
place wherein the injury occurred and the rights and obligatiois
thus established would usually be enforced by the forum despite
inconsistencies with forum law.6  Thus, in.. Coster v. Coster,'
plaintiff-wife's negligence action against her husband was- dismissed
by the New York Court of Appeals because such an action was
barred by the law of Massachusetts, the place of the wife's injury,
even though New York would have permitted such an action had
the injury occurred within its borders.' So, too, in Kaufman v.
'Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessaryf, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657,
675 (1959).
2 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
3 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
4 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
5 See EH RNZWEIG, CoNFLICr OF LAWS § 220, at 578-79 (1962).
6 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 378 (1934).-
7 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
8 Id. at 442, 46 N.E.2d at 511.
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American Youth Hostels, Inc.,9 the defendant charitable corpora-
tion's immunity from liability under Oregon law, the law of the
place of the injury giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action, was
upheld against a public policy challenge in an action in New York.
The lex loci approach had the advantages of extreme ease in
determining the law to be applied and of predictability of the legal
results which would follow from a given set of operative facts.10
The principal weakness of the approach, however, lay in the very
inflexibility which gave rise to its virtues, i.e., its failure to take
account of, and give proper effect to, the social and policy consid-
erations of the states whose laws were involved. It was this
precise weakness which led to a limited departure from the strict
lex loci approach in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, lic.11 In that
case, a New York domiciliary had purchased a ticket from defend-
ant and had departed from a New York airport. While en route,
the plane crashed in Massachusetts and the passenger was killed.
Under a strict application of lex loci, Massachusetts law would have
provided the basis for the New York Court's decision. But,
Massachusetts placed a monetary limit on recovery in wrongful
death actions which was at variance with New York's constitutional
prohibition of such limitations. Because of this strong discrepancy
in public policies between the states and since the question was
characterized as one of remedy rather than one of right, the Court
decided that, although plaintiff's action had to be brought under
the Massachusetts statute, the recovery would not be subject to
the monetary limitation. Chief Judge Desmond stated the basic
rationale for the majority: "Our courts should if possible provide
protection for our own State's people against unfair and anachron-
istic treatment of the law suits which result from these disasters." 12
Although the opinion lacked explicit reference to "grouping of
contacts" or "center of gravity," its approach to the problem of
the choice of law reflected some consideration for the policies under-
lying the laws available for possible application.13  The abandon-
ment of the strict lex loci approach evidenced by Kilberg in the
tort area was already an accomplished fact in the contract area.
In Auten v. Auten,1 4 the Court used the "contacts" approach, i.e.,
rather than strictly applying the traditional approach as to place of
making and place of performing the contract, the Court emphasized
the choice of the law of the state having the most significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute.
95 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959).
10 See 40 ST. JoHN's L. ryEv. 266, 267 (1966).
119 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
12 Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
13 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 480, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282-83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1963).
14 303 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E2d 99 (1954).
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Babcock - The "Contacts" Approach to the Choice of Law
Problem in Tort Actions
The opportunity for the adoption of the contacts-interests
approach in dealing with multi-state tort actions came in the fac-
tually ideal setting of Babcock. Both the plaintiff-guest and the
defendant-host were New York residents who took a weekend auto
trip to Ontario. The automobile was registered and insured in
New York and the trip began and was to end there. While driving
in Ontario, defendant lost control of the auto and plaintiff was
seriously injured when the auto struck a wall. The trial court in
New York dismissed plaintiff's negligence action on the ground
that it would have been barred by the guest statute in effect in
Ontario, the place of the accident. The trial court was affirmed by
the appellate division.15 In reversing the decisions below, the
Court of Appeals rejected the invariable application of lex loci in
tort cases and adopted the principle that the choice of law rule
should reflect a consideration of other factors which bear upon the
purposes to be served by the conflicting laws. To make such a
choice, the Court proceeded first to identify the contacts of the
parties and the occurrence with each state; then to determine the
relative importance of these contacts in terms of the issue involved
and the purposes to be served by the tort rules in question; and,
finally, to define the rights and liabilities of the parties according
to the law of the state which has the most significant relationship.'16
The Court thereby set forth a formula which permits variable
results according to individual facts rather than an absolute rule.
The contacts in Babcock were easily identified: the only contact
with Ontario was the entirely fortuitous occurrence of the accident.
The contacts with New York, however, were many: the injuries
were sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence
of a New York host whose car was garaged, licensed and insured
in New York, and the relationship between the parties had begun
and was to end in New York. Similarly, the policies and interests
behind the conflicting rules of law were easily determined: the
Ontario guest statute had as its purpose the prevention of collusive
claims against Ontario defendants and their insurance carriers by
injured passengers, whereas New York's tort rule was intended to
insure that injured passengers be compensated by negligent drivers,
even at the risk of the assertion of fraudulent claims against New
York defendants and their insurers. The question was then re-
duced to whether the denial of fecovery would advance any legiti-
15Babcock v. Jackson, 17 App. Div. 2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (4th Dep't
1962) (memorandum decision).
16 Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 13, at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240
N.Y.S.-d at 749-50.
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mate interest which Ontario might have, or whether New York's
interests were more direct and compelling. The Court concluded
that the latter was the case in that Ontario's interest was in pro-
tecting Ontario defendants and their insurers and that this interest
could not be imposed upon in a New York action by a New York
plaintiff against a New York defendant. In short, "Ontario has
no conceivable interest in denying a remedy" 17 to a New York
resident when neither the defendant nor his insurer was within the
legislative concern of Ontario. In contrast, there was New York's
strong policy of requiring New York drivers to respond in damages
to passengers who are injured because of their negligence, and this
policy would be needlessly frustrated by denying recovery through
the choice of the foreign law. "Comparison of the relative 'con-
tacts' and 'interests' of New York and Ontario in this litigation,
vis-4-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern
of New York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and
that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal." is
Though Babcock has been commented upon at great length
and cited as support for various positions,' 9 it would seem on its
face to have been a rather ambiguous platform from which to
launch predictions as to the future development of the choice of
law problem involved in the case.2 0  This was so because the
factual contacts and legal issue involved were so clearly and readily
conducive to the result reached by the Court. The contacts were
so heavily oriented toward New York that the Court was not
required to focus upon and isolate with precision those contacts
which were significant in terms of the relevant policies. It would
seem that, at best, Babcock had decided that where the legal issue
is that of liability for negligence of a driver to a passenger, the
legal rule of the state whose contacts relate directly to the policy
behind the rule will be chosen, instead of the legal rule of the state
or nation whose contact with the occurrence bears no relation to
the policy behind its rule. In this light, the place where the
relationship originates and is to terminate would not seem to be a
significant contact in terms of a further examination into the
interest or policy to which such contacts are to be related, i.e.,
whether a host is to be made to respond to his guest for damages.
In short, under the Court's process of reasoning, had the parties
begun their trip in Ontario with the same results, the fact that
their relationship began there would have been a contact but, it is
'17Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
is Ibid.
19 See, e.g., Coments on Babcock v. Jacksom, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212
(1963).
20 "It is unlikely that Judge Fuld will for long recognize in future
cases the rule he announced in Babcock." Id. at 1248.
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contended, a qualitatively insignificant contact, in that it would
not have changed Ontario's lack of interest in the outcome of the
litigation.
Dym -Application of or Departure from Babcock?
Such was the situation in Dym v. Gordon,21 litigation begun
shortly after Babcock, wherein the parties were New York domi-
ciliaries spending part of their summer in Colorado as students.
The guest-host relationship arose there and the plaintiff guest was
injured when defendant's car collided with a car driven by a
Kansas resident. Defendant contended that plaintiff's action should
be dismissed because, under the Colorado guest statute, plaintiff
would have to show defendant's conduct to have been intentional
or negligent to the extent of being in willful and wanton disregard
of plaintiff's rights, facts which plaintiff could not establish. The
trial court rejected defendant's contention and relied on Babcock
to the effect that the fact "that the present parties had taken up
temporary residence in Colorado and intended the transportation
provided to be confined within that State differentiates their status
from that of the Babcock parties only in the degree to which the
locus of the accident in a guest statute State can be said to be
fortuitous." 22 On appeal, the appellate division reversed in a
memorandum opinion and indicated briefly that the temporary
residence of the parties, together with the origin and intended
termination of the relationship within Colorado, indicated the latter
to be the jurisdiction which had the dominant contacts and the
superior claim for the application of its law.23 The Court of
Appeals affirmed in an opinion which purported to be but an
application of Babcock.
24
The Court restated the Babcock process as involving an isola-
tion of the legal issue, an identification of the policies behind the
laws in conflict, and, finally, an evaluation of the respective contacts
to determine the jurisdiction with the superior claim to the applica-
tion of its law.25  The isolation of the issue involved was easily
accomplished: upon what basis may an injured passenger recover
from a negligent driver? However, the identification of the
policies behind the conflicting laws presented a difficulty. The
majority referred to three policies underlying the Colorado guest
21 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463
(1965).22 Dym v. Gordon, 41 Misc. 2d 657, 660 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2 Dym v. Gordon, 22 App. Div. 2d 702, 253 N.Y.S.2d 802 (2d Dep't 1964)
(memorandum opinion).24 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965).
251d. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2& at 466.
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statute: (1) protection against fraudulent claims; (2) prevention
of suits by ungrateful guests; and (3) the priority of the rights of
injured parties in other cars in the assets of a negligent defendant.
It should be noted that the majority cited no judicial or legislative
authority for the third policy consideration and, according to the
dissent, no authority exists.28 The value of such a New York
determined and gratuitously articulated policy for the Colorado
statute is, at best, questionable. Furthermore, the relevance of
Colorado's interest in preserving the negligent defendant's assets
for the occupant of the other car involved in the collision was
diminished by the fact that the driver of the other car was a
Kansas resident. Furthermore, the ingratitude policy suggested,
but not relied on, by the majority also fails to establish itself since,
as pointed out by the dissent, Colorado is legitimately concerned
with the application of this policy only in relation to matters
within its legislative sphere, such as the burdens imposed on
Colorado courts, the regulation of the affairs of Colorado citizens
and the protection of Colorado drivers and their insurers." When
none of these is involved, it cannot be said that Colorado has an
interest calling for the application of its law and especially so in
light of the previous indication in Babcock that the seat of the
relationship was not a qualitatively significant contact.
These questionable details apart, the central basis of the
opinion is that
the parties were dwelling in Colorado when the relationship was formed
and the accident arose out of Colorado based activity; therefore, the
fact that the accident occurred in Colorado could in no sense be termed
fortuitous. . . . Colorado has such significant contacts with the relation-
ship itself and the basis of its formation. [that] the application of its
law and underlying policy are clearly warranted. . . . It is neither the
physical situs where the relationship was created nor the time of its
creation which is controlling but rather these factors in conjunction
with the general intent of the parties as inferred from their actions.28
The argument and conclusion is tenable, in Babcock terms, only
if there is an actual policy to which enumerated contacts are
directly relevant. It is submitted that the majority's third policy
ground should not have been used in the first instance and, had
it not been used, the majority would have had no basis upon
which to find that the seat of the relationship contact was sig-
nificant in choice of law terms. It seems clear that, had the
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 130, 209 N.E2d at 798, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (dissenting opin-
ion).
2s Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794-95, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467. (Emphasis
added.)
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majority limited its consideration to Colorado's articulated policies,
i.e., the prevention of fraudulent claims against Colorado insurers
and the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests, the Babcock
contact-interest analysis would have resulted in the choice of New
York law since Colorado would have had no interest in litigation
between New York parties flowing from a Colorado accident of a
New York garaged and insured car where no Colorado insurer or
host was involved."' In such a case, there would be no difference
qualitatively from Ontario in Babcock. As stated by Judge Fuld
in his dissent: "There is thus no question but that Colorado's
'contacts', though quantitatively greater than those of Ontario in
Babcock, are still not 'significant' as respects the specific issue
presented and that the 'contacts' of New York in relation to that
issue are decidedly superior." 30 In effect, Dyrn, although in form
following the process set forth in Babcock, failed to reach the result
dictated by the analysis in Babcock. Dym viewed as significant
contacts which could not be shown to be directly related to any
clearly enunciated Colorado policy, in that it viewed the origin
of the relationship in the accident state as having a bearing on the
effectuation of Colorado's policy of limiting suits by guests against
their Colorado hosts and insurers. It is submitted that in so doing
Dynt departed from the very essence of Babcock, which refused to
choose foreign law unless there could be shown contacts relating
to that law's policy, which policy would be frustrated by refusing
to apply that foreign law.31
29Id. at 131, 209 N.E.2d at 798-99, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (dissenting
opinion).
30Id. at 133, 209 N.E.2d at 800, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 473 (dissenting
opinion).
3 1 1n Long v. Pan. Ain. World Airways, 16 N.Y2d 337, 213 N.E.2d
796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965), plaintiffs, the representatives of the estates
of Pennsylvania decedents, brought wrongful death actions in New
York. The Court of Appeals, relying on Babcock, held that Pennsylvania,
the jurisdiction in which the decedents were domiciled, where they
had bought their tickets and in which the flight had begun and was to
end, had the greatest interest in the litigation because of its vital concern
with the administration of the estates of its decedents. Pennsylvania law,
permitting substantial recovery, was therefore applied rather than that of
Maryland, which would have barred the action, since Maryland's only
contact was the purely adventitious circumstance that the plane crashed
there and since there was no Maryland policy which could be furthered by
barring the action. Thus, the result in Long is consistent with both Babcock
and Dym since the plaintiffs were domiciliaries of Pennsylvania and,
in addition, the relationship between the parties originated and was to
terminate in Pennsylvania. Long, therefore, does not affect the discussion
of Babcock and Dyin presented above.
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Impact of Macey on Development of Babcock
To demonstrate the extent of the departure one need only
look to the most recent decision of the Court of Appeals in this
area. In Macey v. Rozbicki,32 plaintiff and defendant, New York
domiciliaries, met in Ontario where defendant maintained a summer
residence. Plaintiff was to spend ten days at defendant's summer
home. While defendant was driving his automobile, in which
plaintiff was a passenger, in Ontario, he collided with a car owned
and operated by a Canadian, with the result that plaintiff sustained
personal injuries. Prior to the instant action, the defendant settled
with the Canadian driver of the other car involved in the collision. 33
Thereafter, defendant sought to have plaintiff's action dismissed on
the basis of the same Ontario guest statute involved in Babcock.
Relying on Dynt, which was factually similar to Macey, the trial
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and the appellate divi-
sion affirmed.3 4 The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Babcock.
The majority opinion, without extended discussion of policy or
interest questions, distinguished Dym because, in that case, "the
parties had separately gone to Colorado for a comparatively long
stay, there had been no arrangement made in New York for their
meeting in Colorado . . . [and] the principal situs of the relation-
ship was in Colorado. 35  The Court would not distinguish
Babcock merely because the parties in Macey had a "temporary
meeting together in Canada for a short visit there, especially since
the arrangements for that visit had undoubtedly been made in New
York State." 36 The majority opinion indicates at least a tacit ac-
ceptance of Dym's finding that the situs of the relationship's origin
and the length of the parties' stay ("temporary residence") are
significant factors, apart from any demonstrated relevance to a
policy or interest which would be affected by the choice of law
made by the forum court.
This result disturbed Judge Keating who, in his concurring
opinion, argued that "this case and Dym v. Gordon are indistin-
guishable and that Dym v. Gordon and Babcock v. Jackson are
irreconcilable. . .. ," 37 To reach these conclusions, he argued that
neither the origin of the relationship nor the length of the stay
32 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
33 Macey v. Rozbicki, 23 App. Div. 2d 532, 533, 256 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203-04
(4th Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision) (dissenting opinion).34 1Macey v. Rozbicki, 23 App. Div. 2d 532, 256 N.Y.S2d 202 (4th
Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision).
35 Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 221 N.E.2d 380, 381-82, 274
N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (1966). (Emphasis added.)36 Id. at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593. (Emphasis added.)3 7 Id. at 293, 221 N.E.2d at 385, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (concurring
opinion).
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had any relation. to the interests or policies of either New York
or Ontario, as reflected by their varying, rules of law as to a host's
liability for injuries negligently inflicted on' his guest.
The only facts having any significant- bearing on the applicable choice
of law in guest statute cases are the residence of the parties and the
place in which the automobile is insured and registered . .. [since]
only these facts have any relation to the policies sought to be vindicated
by the ostensibly conflicting laws.38
Thus, the fact that the -parties began their relationship within
Ontario and that they were planning to stay for a short period
could give no greater interest to Ontario in the outcome of the
New York litigation, since these facts bore no relation to the
Ontario statute's purpose to protect Ontario hosts and insureds
from fraudulent claims by guests. In short, -the only significant
contacts in Babcock, Dynt and Macey were the domicile of the
parties and the place where the cr was registered and insured.
The attempted distinction of Dyin based upon duration of presence
and an intent deduced therefrom can be seen to be inconsistent
with the Babcock rationale of determining the significance of con-
tacts in terms of their relevance to'the policies and interests of the
laws involved. Recognizing considerations of stare decisis, Judge
Keating nevertheless urged the Court to overrule Dym before it
could become encrusted in the law and confuse an already complex
area.3
Having considered the significant decisions bearing on the
issue, it becomes necessary to determine, if possible, what is the
principle underlying the determinations made in Babcock, DynI
and Macey. If Babcock was indeed faithfully applied in Dym,
the answer is not clear since, as pointed out above, Dymt considers
significant contacts which cannot be shown to be vitally related to
the policies behind the conflicting rules, an essential element of the
Babcack process. If, however, Dym is an inaccurate rendering of
Babcock, as contended by Judge Keating in Macey and by Judges
Fuld and Desmond in Dym, the Macey majority's attempt to dis-
tinguish Dym casts some doubt upon the vitality of Babcock. To
shed some light on the Dym decision, it may be useful to examine
the outlook or point of view from which the majority opinion in
Dyrn appears to have been written. The recurring emphasis is on
a rejection of Babcock as a declaration of the'supremacy of New
York "public policy" in conflicts cases involving New York domi-
381d. at 295, 221 N.E.2d at 383, 274 N.Y.S2d at 595 (concurring
opinion).
39M. at 298, 221 N.E.2d at 385, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (concurring
opinion).
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ciliaries. The Court implies that plaintiff's contention that New
York law should apply is "reminiscent of the days when British
citizens travelled to the four corners of the world secure in the
belief that their conduct would be governed solely by the law of
England," 40 and that "this argument gives one the feeling that a
preference for whatever law will compensate the New York tort
plaintiff lurks in the background." 4  It seems justifiable to con-
clude that there was at least some interest in the Dym opinion
in putting to rest any erroneous interpretation of Babcock as a
purely parochial and chauvinistic coronation of New York law.
It is submitted, however, that dictum to that effect would have
been sufficient to allay fears of such an interpretation. Neverthe-
less, the majority of the Court in Macey sought to uphold the
validity of D3yn as representing " 'no departure from the rule
announced in Babcock; merely an example of its application ... ' ", 42
The position of the majority in Macey, however, must be read in
light of Judge Keating's strong concurrence and especially with
regard to the stare decisis consideration to which he makes refer-
ence, a consideration which was likely to have carried great weight
with the Court in terms of a precedent of so recent a vintage. In
light of these considerations, the question of Dyres present vitality
hardly seems to be foreclosed and, with this possibility as a back-
ground, the question then becomes one of determining what should
be the future course of decision in this area.
It is contended that Dyin is not a logical application of the
process established by Babcock and that the reasons for this are
amply set forth in Judge Fuld's dissent in Dyrn and Judge Keat-
ing's concurring opinion in Macey. This being so, it is contended
that, in guest statute cases, where there are no real competing
interests, the choice of law problem is to be resolved on the basis
of thq domicile of the parties and the place where the car was
registered and insured, the only significant contacts in terms of the
Babcock interest analysis. Such an approach is not, as implied
by the majority in Dyn,43 an adoption of domicile per se as the
controlling consideration in these cases. Rather, it is a recognition
that domicile, as a contact, is directly relevant to the interest sought
to be served by the law chosen and, when there is no contact giving
rise to a real interest in the competing jurisdiction, as in Babcock
and Macey, there is actually no conflict which must be resolved.
This approach may be termed mechanical only in the sense that any
40 Dym v. Gordon, supra note 24, at 127, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.
2d at 468.
41 Id. at 127,'209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
42 Macey v. Rozbicki, supra note 35, at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274
N.Y.S.2d at 593.43Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 126, 209 N.E.2d 792, 795, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463, 468 (1965).
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logical process, once fully articulated and developed in relation to a
particular problem with consistent results, can be then termed
mechanical.
44
It is contended that such an approach is a logical and con-
sistent development of the Babcock process and, to demonstrate
this logic and consistency, it may be useful to apply it to some
factually varying hypotheticals.
(1) An Ontario host and an Ontario guest are driving in
New York in a car insured in Ontario and the guest is injured as
a result of the host's negligence. The contacts of domicile of the
parties and insurance give rise to a significant interest in Ontario,
since these are precisely the factors upon which Ontario's guest
statute was intended to operate. New York's only contact with
the occurrence might be seen, in the language of Babcock and
Macey, as the purely fortuitous circumstance that the accident took
place within its borders. But, the very fact of its occurrence within
New York brings into play New York's intense interest in applying
its compensatory negligence rules to actions by plaintiffs injured in
New York. "Babcock was not intended to and did not change
the established law of the State of New York that a guest has a
cause of action for personal injuries against a host in an accident
occurring within this State whether those involved are residents
or domiciliaries of this State or not." 45 Thus, in the case where
the law of the state wherein the accident occurs permits no excep-
tions to its compensatory negligence law (and this is the sole basis
for the conflict with the law of another interested state), the choice
of law is determined by this pervasive policy. In effect, though
a real conflict admittedly exists, the intensity of New York's policy,
coupled with the status of Ontario's statute as an exception to its
general compensatory policy in the negligence area, indicates that
a New York court should not apply a law so fundamentally at
variance with its own law. Thus, in -the factual setting above,
New York is the jurisdiction with the predominant interest and
its law would therefore be the proper choice.
(2) A New York host, driving a New York insured car,
negligently injures a Colorado guest in Ontario. With a guest
statute in Colorado similar to that in effect in Ontario, the domicile-
insurance-interest approach would indicate that the choice of New
York law would be proper. Again, Ontario's only contact with
the parties and the occurrence is the fortuitous happening of the
44 Chief Judge Desmond expressed, in reply to such a characterization, the
following: "'Mechanical' is a mere epithet in this connection." Id. at 134,
209 N.E.2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (dissenting opinion).
45 Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553(3d Dep't 1966) (applying New York law on facts identical to those
presented in hypothetical above).
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event within its borders and this is insignificant in terms of the
interest reflected by the Ontario statute. Colorado, however, has
a domicile contact with one of the parties which, in a mechanical
application of domicile per se as a decisive factor in the choice of
law, would result in a basis for the application of its law. But,
under the suggested approach, identification is only a first, incon-
clusive step in the choice of law process: the contact, once
identified, must then be directly related to the policy or interest
to be served by that jurisdiction's law before it can be considered
of any significance in the choice of law. The purpose of the
Colorado statute, like that of Ontario, being that of protecting
Colorado hosts and their insurers from fraudulent claims, the
domicile contact is insignificant since the domiciliary involved in
this litigation is a member of neither of those classes and his
obtaining a remedy or denial of a remedy will have no effect upon
the statutory purpose of Colorado. New York's domicile contact,
in contrast, is significant in terms of its policy of requiring negli-
gent drivers to respond in damages to their injured passengers
and the existence of this policy negatives any concern on its part
for possible imposition on the New York insurer. In terms of the
suggested approach, New York is the jurisdiction with the only
significant interest in the outcome of the litigation. It should be
noted, in response to a possible argument that such a plaintiff fares
better in New York than he would have in Colorado, that this is
hardly true if, as one is entitled to hope, Colorado were also to
adopt the suggested choice of lav approach, since the result should
remain the same. In addition, support for the application of New
York's compensatory rule of law may be found by looking upon
Ontario's general compensatory policy as subordinated in cases to
which its guest statute applies, but as coming to the surface when
that statute has no applicability. Thus, when the case involves
neither an Ontario driver nor insurer, its guest statute has no
applicability and its general compensatory policy reasserts itself
and lends weight to the application of New York's compensatory
scheme.
(3) A New York guest and his Colorado host are riding in
Ontario in a car insured in Colorado and, as a result of the host's
negligence, the guest sustains personal injuries. In an action in
New York, the court is faced here with a real conflict (in contrast
to the preceding situation where, upon analysis, the purported con-
flict dissolved with the discovery that one jurisdiction lacked
significant contacts). Again, as above, Ontario's sole contact is
that it was the site of the accident and, as above, Ontario therefore
lacked any significant contact with the parties or the occurrence.
But, Colorado has both a domicile and an insurance contact which
are directly relevant to the purposes of its statute. The Colorado
defendant and his insurer are precisely the parties intended to be
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protected by the statute's denial of a remedy to a party such as
plaintiff. Colorado, then, has. significant contacts which call for the
application of its law. But, New York also has a domicile contact
which is directly relevant .to its law requiring negligent defendants
to compensate persons injured as a result of their negligence and
which is therefore significant in the, resolution of the choice of
law problem. It has been suggested that, where this is in fact the
situation, a court has no basis upon which to decide which jurisdic-
tion has the most significant relationship with the parties and the
occurrence. In a case where unavoidable conflict actually exists,
it has been suggested that the court apply the law 'of the forum
and the Kilberg case is cited as an example of this solution. 0
According to this view, arbitrary though this approach may be,
there is no less arbitrary approach possible since there is no basis
upon which the court can. decide which of two jurisdictions has the
most significant contacts. It is suggested, however, that there may
be a basis upon which such a choice can be made and it might be
found again in Ontario's general compensatory law of negligence
rising to the surface in cases to which its guest statute exception
has no application. Thus, the resolution of the conflict between
the law of the interested jurisdictions, New York and Colorado,
might be effected by reference to the law of the disinterested situs
jurisdiction, Ontario, to -give added weight to the- law with which
it is in harmony. In the -fact situation, presented, Ontario's law
is superficially in harmony with that of. Colorado in that both have
guest statutes; but, in the concrete situation in question, the real
harmony lies in the general compensatory negligence law of New
York and Ontario, since Ontario's guest .statute exception has no
application either to the plaintiff or to the defendant. Ontario's
law, then, might be used as a basis upon which to support a choice
of New York law. A further basis might be found in the fact
that the forum jurisdiction is one of the interested jurisdictions and
that, therefore, in cases presenting real conflicts, it should not be
called upon to apply a foreign law fundamentally at variance with
that of the forum. Thus, where an interested jurisdiction is also
the forum jurisdiction, whether it be Colorado or New York, and
it is presented with a conflict between its own law and that of
another interested jurisdiction, it should be -able .to give added and
decisive weight to the fact that it is also the forum of the action.
Conclusion -.
At least in regard to the gtest .statute situation, it seems
likely that, but for the majority opinion in Dyn and its tortured
46 Currie, Comzents on Babcock v. Jacks04, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1212,
1233, 1242-43 (1963).
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reaffirmation in Macey, the orderly development of the Babcock
process to the point of narrowing the significant contacts down
to those of domicile and insurance would be clear. Notwith-
standing the above-mentioned factors of ambiguity, it appears at
least likely that, with further litigation in this area, the position
of Judges Desmond and Fuld in Dyin and that of Judge Keating
in Macey will become the controlling law and, it is contended,
there is ample basis in logic and law for considering such a
development as progressive and welcome. To the possible argu-
ment that such an approach would be as arbitrary and inflexible
as the now displaced lex loci approach, the very clear response
is that this approach negatives the arbitrariness of the latter
precisely because it involves a reasoned examination of the reason
for the choice of law, rather than merely pointing out the law
to be applied and thereby avoiding a choice in the first instance.
In a very real sense, the suggested approach indicates progress
by the mere fact that it requires a carefully weighed choice and
this is a sharp differentiation from the prior process of merely
articulating a foregone conclusion in terms of a two-word
formula.
THE PROBLEMS REGARDING THE FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTE
-MucH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
Very often the proposed solution to a problem, upon adoption,
becomes more of a burden than the problem which it was intended
to resolve. The transfer statute set forth in the Judicial Code
[hereinafter referred to as section 1404 (a) ] enables a district
court, once jurisdiction and proper venue have been established, to
transfer any civil action to another district where it "might have
been brought" for the convenience of litigants and witnesses, or
in the interest of justice.' Enacted in 1948, it substantially re-
places, in the federal courts, the common-law doctrine of forum
non conveniens 2 which provided for the dismissal, without pre-
judice, of an action even where the jurisdiction and venue re-
quirements were satisfied, when it was for the convenience of the
'28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
2 Forum izon conveniens still finds some life in the federal courts:
it is available when there is no alternative federal forum to which the
action may be transferred. Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.,
311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962). But examination of the doctrine after the
adoption of the transfer statute is without the scope of this note.
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